This paper analyses the anti-reductionist argument from renormalisation group explanations of universality, and shows how it can be rebutted if one assumes that the explanation in question is captured by the counterfactual dependence account of explanation.
1 Introduction: The anti-reductionist challenge Statistical and condensed matter physics have always been a rich source for antireductionist arguments. One prominent anti-reductionist argument turns on the theoretical role played by in nite limits, such as the thermodynamic and continuum limits, in the context of renormalization group (RG) explanations. Antireductionists have appealed to RG explanations of, e.g., the occurrence of phase transitions and the universality of critical exponents. They have argued that the indispensable explanatory usage of continuum limits in these explanations speaks against reductionism, because such usage reveals a signi cant limitation of a more fundamental reductive theory that describes the atomic constituents of ultimately nite (albeit micro-physically absolutely huge) bits of matter. (Batterman 2000 (Batterman , 2002a (Batterman , 2010 (Batterman , 2011 (Batterman , 2015 Morrison 2012 Morrison , 2015 In particular, anti-reductionists have pointed to the indispensable explanatory role of the xed points of renormalization group transformations. These xed points presuppose limit assumptions that are arguably in tension with reductionism. (Menon and Callender (2013, 197) nicely summarize : "The xed point only appears when the system has no characteristic length scale. This is why the in nite particle limit is crucial for the renormalization group approach. ") Thus, taken at face value, the xed points (incorporating such limit assumptions) contradict the niteness of the physical systems exhibiting universality -a niteness that is assumed by the fundamental physical theory to which reductionists allude. The upshot is that the explanatory indispensability of these xed points is thus seen to reveal a philosophically signi cant limitation of a more fundamental theory.
Let us call the anti-reductionist argument sketched above "the argument from in nite limits". This argument can be seen to underwrite a speci c challenge for the reductionists:
Anti-reductionist Challenge: The reductionists ought to show how the xed points involved in RG explanations of critical phenomena can be (a) explanatorily indispensable and, at the same time, (b) compatible with reductionism.
Our main goal in this paper is to show how a reductionist can meet this challenge. We will assume for the sake of the argument that xed points (and the presupposed limit assumptions) are indeed indispensable for RG explanations of universality. By making this assumption we will try to make the strongest possible case for anti-reductionism. Notwithstanding this assumption, we will argue that the supposed indispensability does not lead to any ontological commitments threatening reductionism. We will do so by arguing that a particular account of explanation -the counterfactual dependence account -captures the explanatory character of RG explanations, and that in the light of this understanding of RG explanations the indispensability of xed points is not ontologically committing.
Our response to the anti-reductionist challenge addresses two clear lacunae with regard to the recent debate.
The rst lacuna is that the reductionist analyses of the in nite limits (in- we focus on meeting the anti-reductionist challenge with respect to the RG explanation of universality.
The second lacuna concerns the fact that relatively little work has been done to explicate the explanatory character of RG explanations of universality. On the one hand, the reductionists' focus has been on inter-theoretic reduction relations (mostly framed as neo-Nagelian reduction). RG explanations, insofar as these have been discussed at all, have been portrayed -without much of an argument -in terms of the deductive-nomological (DN) account of explanations, as be tting a Nagelian approach to reduction (Butter eld 2011 , Norton 2012 . Portraying RG explanations as exemplifying the DN-model is a controversial and somewhat surprising claim, since most philosophers of science today agree that the DN account of scienti c explanation is deeply problematic. So regarding it as an adequate explication of a particular scienti c explanation requires a good rationale.
approach faces serious objections (that are independent of the problems of the DN-model) and we do not regard it as convincing (see Lange 2015; Reutlinger 2017 ; AUTHOR for detailed arguments).
In e ort to address the second lacuna, we will explicate the explanatory character of the RG explanation of universality in relation to the counterfactual dependence account of explanation.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the (anti-)reductionism debate surrounding RG xed points. In particular, we highlight a connection between the anti-reductionist argument from in nite limits and explanatory indispensability arguments. In Section 3, we clarify the explanandum at stake, emphasising the theoretical context of physics of critical phenomena that preceded the RG analysis. In Section 4, we provide a detailed exposition of the relevant physics of RG explanans and the role of xed points ( §4.1), and we argue that the counterfactual dependence account of scienti c explanations captures RG explanations of universality ( §4.2). In Section 5, we respond to the anti-reductionist challenge on the basis of the results of Section 4: we argue that the explanatory appeal to xed points and limits is (merely) instrumentally indispensable and, therefore, it does not lead to an ontological commitment threatening reductionism. In the end we also discuss the limitations of our argument vis-à-vis explanatory (as opposed to ontological) anti-reductionism.
Anti-reductionism and Explanatory Indispensability
Let us now examine the structure of the argument from in nite limits more closely.
The anti-reductionists suggest that RG explanations undermine reductionism due to commitment to the xed points of renormalization group transformations (and the presupposed limit asumptions). These are often said to 'control' critical phenomena, the universality of which is said to 'rely on the existence' of xed points. The following passage from a leading text book is typical:
Since [the behaviour of correlation functions] depends only on the xed-point Hamiltonian, the correlation functions corresponding to all Hamiltonians that converge after RG transformations toward the same xed point, have the same critical behaviour. Such a universality property thus divides the space of Hamiltonians into universality classes. Universality, beyond the quasi-Gaussian approximation, re-lies on the existence of large-distance (IR) xed points of the RG in the space of Hamiltonians. (Zinn-Justin 2007, 226 . Our emphasis).
Indeed, the RG framework is, in a sense, all about the xed points of RG transformations: their properties, their classi cation, and the conditions under which they exist. In as far as this framework furnishes genuine explanations of critical phenomena that turns on these xed points and their properties, and insofar as these xed points involve limits of modelling parameters that transcend the nitude associated with the more fundamental theory, there is a clear prima facie challenge to reductionism here.
Batterman argues in this spirit that 'there are very good reasons to deny that
[critical] phenomena are reducible to "fundamental" theory ' (2011, 1034) . 2 The renormalization group explains the universal behavior at criticality essentially by exploiting the divergence (blow up to in nity)
of the correlation length. [. . . ] Most crucial to the renormalization group explanation is, as noted, the ineliminable appeal to the thermodynamic limit and to the singularities that emerge in that limit.
(2011, 1043)
The sense of anti-reductionism that Batterman supports by pointing to the explanatory indispensability of the xed points primarily concerns explanation, not ontology. (The 'fundamental' theory, Batterman explicitly says, "gets the ontology of blobs of gases and uids right" (2011, 1034) .)
The step from 'explanatory indispensability' to ontology is relatively short, however, and various philosophers are willing to take it. This willingness can be rooted, in general, in a venerable tradition in the philosophy of science that associates scienti c realists' ontological commitments tightly to explanatory indispensability. Thus, Psillos (2011) , for instance, follows Sellars (1963) in adopting an 'explanatory criterion of reality', according to which "something is real if its positing plays an indispensable role in the explanation of well-founded phenomena. " (Psillos, 2011, p. 15) More generally, philosophers in the Quinean and Putnamian tradition have argued for realist commitment to mathematical and other 2 Batterman puts the term 'fundamental' in scare quotes, because he regards it as ambiguous: "a theory may be fundamental in that it properly characterizes the detailed constitution of the systems it studies, but can fail to be fundamental in its ability to explain and provide understanding of the systems it correctly describes. " (Ibid.) abstracta on the basis of their explanatory indispensability to our best theories of empirical phenomena (see e.g. Baker and Colyvan 2011). Morrison (2012 Morrison ( , 2015 has defended ontological anti-reductionism in this spirit -both in general, and with respect to RG xed-points especially. Regarding 'the explanatory power of xed points', in particular, Morrison argues that the reductionists "ignore a crucial feature of emergence, speci cally the ability to properly explain universal behaviour and [. . . ] the role of RG in that context. " (2015, 110) Namely:
The calculation of values for critical indices and the cooperative behaviour de ned in terms of xed points is the foundation of universality. RG is the only means possible for explaining that behaviour; what happens at nite N is, in many ways, irrelevant. Finite systems can be near the xed point in the RG space and linearization around a xed point will certainly tell you about nite systems, but the xed point itself requires the limit. (Ibid.). 3 Turning now to the reductionists, the indispensability of RG xed points is not by any means denied by them; rather, the issue concerns their status as (non-)representational elements of the less fundamental theory. Thus, Norton (2012, 222) , for example, characterizes them as "points in a diagram: mathematical pegs on which to hang limit properties. " Norton draws an apt distinction between a meaningful and well-de ned limit of a sequence of systems, on the one hand, and a limit of a sequence of properties, on the other. The crux of the distinction is that the latter may not correspond to any possible system, in which case it cannot function as an 'idealisation', but at best as a useful 'approximation'. According to Norton, RG xed points are such approximations, for they "do not arise from an investigation of the properties of in nite limit systems. They are not idealizations" (Ibid.).
However, regardless of its status as an 'idealisation' or 'approximation', an anti-reductionist may respond that the very fact that a mathematical limit that plays an indispensable explanatory role is still puzzling from the point of view of the more fundamental theory. Why is the use of such limits indispensable for explaining the phenomena? Why doesn't the indispensability of such limits indicate a feature of critical phenomena that transcends the ontology of the more fundamental theory?
Moreover, problems arise for Norton regarding his construal of an RG explanation as a covering law explanation (viz. DN-explanation):
"Renormalization group methods take the theoretical framework of statistical mechanics as the covering law. They select as the particular conditions a broad class of Hamiltonians pertinent to the materials.
They then derive universality under conditions close to criticality.
The renormalization group analysis simply is a covering law explanation. " (2012, 227) There are two di culties with Norton's appeal to the DN-model here: rst, regarding the DN-model's assumption that the explanans statements are (approximately) true, and secondly, regarding general objections to the DN-model. shown that the provision of nomic expectability is neither necessary nor su cient for having an explanation (e.g. Salmon 1989, 46-50) . Consequently it is increasingly popular to identify explanatory understanding with knowledge of explanatory dependence relations that are taken to di er from nomic expectability, even in cases that are structurally similar to DN-deductions (Woodward 2003 , Strevens 2008 . These prominent viewpoints challenge the DN-model on rather general grounds in a way that really puts the onus on those who insist that the DN-model is nevertheless appropriate in the speci c context of RG explanations.
In a spirit similar to Norton, Menon and Callender (2013) admit that RG xed points are an indispensable part of the explanatory resources needed to account for critical phenomena, and also that xed points transcend the representational resources of the more fundamental, nite, reducing theory. Yet they go on to suggest that we can account in reductive terms for why the explanatory appeal to xed points is warranted. Their discussion makes little connection with physicists' explanations of universality, however, and they o er no analysis of the nature of physicists' RG explanations. Their account thus unfortunately leaves open the indispensable role that RG xed points play in actual scienti c accounts of universality, and exactly why this role can be regarded as ontologically innocuous. These issues that are not addressed by Menon and Callender are precisely the target of this paper. 4 There are also some other insightful reductionist commentaries on the theoretical role of xed points in the RG analysis of critical phenomena, but we nd these similarly lacking in perspicuity regarding the xed points' explanatory role.
For example, while we are largely in agreement with Hüttemann et al. (2015) , we don't think they go far enough in responding to the anti-reductionist challenge by virtue of leaving the explanatory role of RG xed points unanalysed. And we see little reason to analyse RG explanations simply as DN explanations, as Butter eld (2011a, 2011b) and Norton (2012) do. It is against this context that we now aim to do better.
The RG Explanandum
The RG framework furnishes a number of explanations regarding critical phenomena. The rst order of business is to precisify the explanandum that we have chosen to focus on: the universality of critical exponents. Making this explanandum more precise contributes to addressing the ' rst lacuna' presented in the introduction.
Critical phenomena involve continuous (second-order) phase transitions in macroscopic systems near the critical point, where large-scale collective behaviour becomes signi cant. Standard examples of systems exhibiting critical phenomena include liquid-vapour and magnets. Dynamically generated collective behaviour is quanti ed by the correlation length, characterising the scale at which a collective behaviour is observed. At the critical point the correlation length diverges universality, they summarise their argument: "When we try to explain the universality of critical behavior in nite systems, we do have to employ the in nite idealization, but as we have seen, this idealization is not irreducible if we can use the topological structure of system space in our reductive explanation. We can de-idealize for particular systems, and see why they can be treated as if they ow to the critical point. Understanding the behavior of in nite systems is crucial to explaining the behavior of nite systems, since we only get the xed points by examining the behavior of in nite systems, but this in itself does not imply emergence. We agree with Batterman (2011) that mathematical singularities in the renormalization group method are information sources, not information sinks. We disagree with his contention that the renormalization group explanation requires the in nite idealization, and is thus emergent. It requires consideration of the behavior of in nite systems, but it does not require us to idealize any nite system as an in nite system. Any actual in nite idealizations in a renormalization group explanation can be de-idealized using nite-size cross-over theory. Locating xed points does not require an in nite idealization, it just requires that our microscopic theory can talk about in nite systems, and indeed it can. " (2013, (in the models of critical phenomena), indicating that near this point it becomes very large, capturing system-wide macroscopic properties. Near the critical point macroscopic, thermodynamic properties obey characteristic power laws as a function of reduced temperature t, proportional to the distance from critical temperature: t = t−tc tc . It is remarkable that micro-physically very di erent systems, such as liquid-vapour and ferromagnets, can have similar power laws, with identical critical exponents. This is an instance of the kind of universality that comprises the explanandum at stake.
Consider, for example, the scaling laws obeyed by ferromagnets, on the one hand, and simple liquids, on the other. (Here we have magnetic susceptibility χ, heat capacity C H , and magnetisation M ; compressibility κ, heat capacity C V , and liquid and gas densities ρ l , ρ g .) 5
It is crucial to be clear on the precise nature of universality in question. It is not the case that all di erent systems exhibiting critical phenomena are exactly similar in this way. Rather, simple liquid-vapour and ferromagnetic systems have the same critical exponents by virtue of belonging to the same universality class (viz. the 'Ising class', also containing the theoretical spin-1/2 Ising model). Other universality classes describe systems with di erent critical exponents. In general, a speci c universality class, identi ed by its critical exponents, depends on the following variables: spatial dimensionality, the symmetry of the order parameter (also called the 'spin dimensionality'), and the range of the microscopic interactions. We will return to this central issue regarding what universality depends on below.
The real explanandum of the RG analysis is this kind of curtailed universality, with systems falling within a relatively small number of distinct universality classes. A blunt notion of universality -that micro-physically di erent systems can obey power laws with identical critical exponents -is not at issue, as it can be established by 'classical' (non-RG) methods of mean-eld theory and Landau, and it indeed had already been established prior to the development of RG analysis (see e.g. Als-Nielsen and Birgeneau, 1977; Kopietz et al. 2010, ch. 2) . These classical methods yield estimates of critical exponents that do not fare well empirically, however, and they failed to indicate the dependence of the critical exponents on systems' spatial dimensionality in particular. The celebrated explanatory contribution of the RG analysis must be appreciated and understood in this (pre-RG) theoretical context. This is something that many expositions of the RG analysis emphasise quite explicitly:
The starting point is mean eld theory which allows us to describe phase transitions and explore the neighbourhood of the critical temperature. In the case of second order phase transitions, continuous phase transitions where the correlation length diverges, this leads to the concept of super-universality. The latter is summarized in Landau's theory of critical phenomena. A number of quantities, like the exponents which characterize the singular behaviour of physical observables near the critical temperature, are universal, i.e. independent of the system (provided it has only short range interactions), and even the dimensions of space. However, empirical evidence, exact solutions of 2D models, and nally an analysis of corrections to mean eld theory, had shown that a universality of such general nature could not be true. [. . . ] The existence of even a more restricted universality was puzzling. It took many years to develop the [RG] which explains the origin of universality: it relies on the existence of IR xed points of RG transformations. (Zinn-Justin, 2006, 218) What we are emphasising here, along with Zinn-Justin, is the fact that in the pre-RG context of mean eld and Landau theories what really needed explaining was not universality per se -how microscopically very di erent systems could be similar in their macro properties -but the observed dependence of critical exponents and universality classes on the systems' spatial dimensions and the other features that carve the nature into these 'universality kinds'. So, the question was:
how does it follow from the laws of statistical mechanics, including the dynamical laws and the partition function connecting the micro-and macro-levels, that the properties exhibiting universality depend on the variables outlined above. The explanatory contribution of the RG analysis has been to answer this question by deriving the values of the critical exponents for large classes of Hamiltonians in a way that brings out the explanatory dependencies as their logico-mathematical consequence for systems of su ciently many components. 6 Furthermore, this framework provides an understanding of the nature of the dependence in question as a collective probabilistic matter, having to do with the way in which chancy uctuations across a huge range of scales relate and contribute to the macroscopic properties. 7
The RG Explanans
In this section, we will reconstruct the relevant physics of the explanans of RG explanations in detail ( §4.1). Then, in response to the 'second lacuna' presented in the introduction, we will suggest that the counterfactual dependence account of explanation nicely captures the explanatory character of RG explanations ( §4.2).
The Physics of the RG Explanans
After some preliminaries (in subsection (a)), we will focus on: (b) the sense of coarse-graining associated with the renormalisation operation; (c) the notion of xed-point of the renormalisation operation and its explanatory role; and (d) the notion of universality class of Hamiltonians. Recall that a Hamiltonian, or energy function, characterizes the energy of the interactions between the system's components, and also the energetic e ect of the external conditions (e.g. magnetic eld) on the system. For example, for a very simple spin-1/2 Ising model, the Hamiltonian function is given by
Here S i is the 'spin' parameter (S i = ±1) ranging over all lattice sites; the rst summation is over all interacting pairs of spins, and the coupling constant J gives the interaction energy. The energetic contribution of an external magnetic eld is represented by h. The lattice of spins can be a 1-dimensional string, 2-dimensional square lattice, 3-dimensional cubic lattice, or (more abstractly) ddimensional hyper-cubic lattice.
For this class of models, the spin parameter S i has only one component, and the model has global Z 2 symmetry: in the absence of an external magnetic eld the Hamiltonian is invariant under S i → −S i (∀i). We can enlarge the set of possible interactions by allowing the spin parameter to have further possible values, and/or more components. For instance, in spin-1 Ising models S i ∈ {1, 0, −1}, and in q-state Potts models S i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , q}. The spin parameter can also be a vector, instead of scalar. For example, in XY-models the spin parameter has two components, S i = (S x i , S y i ), and in n-vector models S i has n components. Changes in these features of the spin parameter can change the symmetry of the Hamiltonian (depending on how it has been de ned in terms of the various spinspin interactions), resulting in di erent critical exponents.
The dependence of the critical exponent on spatial dimensionality and the dimensionality of the spin parameter can be studied by RG analyses of speci c modpre-RG approaches of critical phenomena underestimate the importance of statistical uctuations, the probability of which increases along with spatial dimensionality (see e.g. Stanley, 1999, 365) . transformations can be used to determine the critical exponents near the critical point, as we will presently explain. Roughly speaking, universality with respect to variation in the speci c Hamiltonian then follows from di erent systems' similarity in this respect, and the RG analysis provides a sense in which a given universality class depends on the Hamiltonians in that class having this feature (in addition to depending on spatial dimensionality and the dimensionality of the spin parameter).
In order to esh out this sketch, and to pinpoint the role played by RG xed points in nding out about this dependence, we now present a schematic outline 9 There are limits how much a Hamiltonian can be changed without a ecting critical phenomena. It matters, in particular, how short/long-range the micro-interactions are. Again, this can be studied by case-speci c models, looking e.g. at spin-1/2 Ising models for interaction
SiSj as a function of ω, with rij the distance between lattice sites i, j (e.g. Cannas, 1995) .
of an RG analysis. 10 The gist of the (very broadly applicable) RG framework is to explore ways of re-expressing -'renormalizing' -a set of relevant modelling parameters in terms of another (possibly simpler) set of parameters, and then rescaling the system, in a way that keeps unchanged some physical aspects of interest. In the context of critical phenomena, a renormalization transformation amounts to the coarse-graining of the short-distance degrees of freedom, while keeping a system's long-distance physics xed. 11 This is achieved, in particular, by ensuring that the partition function is left intact by the re-parametrisation. 
Analysing the structure of such ow in the space of parameters is the essence of the RG analysis: it qualitatively explains why the long-distance physics (especially with respect to scaling laws) for microscopically di erent systems S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ,. . . is similar near their respective critical points, and it quantitatively allows for a calculation of critical exponents. (We will focus on the qualitative explanation below. See Appendix for comments on the quantitative aspects.)
A rough idea of qualitative RG understanding of universality near critical- 10 We only provide a schematic presentation of the key concepts involved in an RG analysis; for further details see e.g. Fisher (1983 Fisher ( , 1998 , Wilson (1983) , Cardy (1996) Nishimori and Ortiz (2010) . Our presentation is mostly drawn from the Nishimori and Ortiz (2010) . See also Appendix for further details.
11 Much of the ingenuity in the development of the RG framework has gone into techniques that can be used to implement with su cient rigour this kind of coarse-graining (e.g. real-space RG, momentum space RG, Monte Carlo RG).
12 R b is associated with a scaling factor b, which determines the rescaling of the system's length scale by 1/b. A generic Hamiltonian is written as the sum of products of parameters un and 'operators' (viz. microscopic degrees of freedom) On: H = n unOn = n u · O. For example, in equation (1) the coupling constants J and h are parameters, and SiSj and Si are operators. Renormalisation transformations form a semi-group:
ity can be given as follows. Let's assume that two Hamiltonians H 1 and H 2 in the space of parameters display similar ow behaviour and end up close to one another under repeated RG transformations; viz. the physics captured by those Hamiltonians can be modelled, at a su ciently coarse-grained level, by e ective Hamiltonians that are close to one another in the space of parameters. Then the two systems captured by H 1 and H 2 have a similar long-distance behaviour. It is an extraordinary fact that large classes of possible systems (viz. classes of possible Hamiltonians) in this way lead to similar long-distance behaviour near criticality. The RG analysis brings out this fact by revealing broad structural features exhibited by RG ows in the space of parameters. It is here that an indispensable theoretical role is played by the xed points of RG ows.
(c) Fixed-points. A xed point u * (in the space of parameters) is de ned as a point (or more generally, a sub-manifold) that gets mapped to itself under renormalization, thereby terminating the RG ow (since further RG transformations do not ow to a di erent point): u * = R b (u * ). Prima facie, it seems possible that RG ows might exhibit wildly unstable, even chaotic behaviour, indicating very ne-tuned dependence of a system's large-scale behaviour on its microscopic couplings. It turns out that this isn't so (at least for very large classes of Hamiltonians of interest): instead, in the space of parameters there are points -the xed points of RG transformations -towards which RG ows are 'attracted'. There is thus much structure and regularity to the way in which di erent Hamiltonians 'coarse-grain' so as to give rise to similar macroscopic properties. In particular, under repeated RG transformations the e ective, coarse-grained Hamiltonians 'gravitate' close to a xed point, as long as the starting point of the iterated RG transformations -xed by an original microphysical Hamiltonian and some given values of the control parameters -is su ciently close to a broad basin of attraction of the xed point. RG xed points and their associated basins of attraction thus give the abstract space of parameters an interesting topological structure.
The theoretical resources involving the xed points and their basins of attraction are indispensable (in the current state of physics at least) for grasping this topological structure exhibited by the space of parameters, and for studying its repercussions on those models that, from the perspective of the more fundamental theory, can be taken to faithfully represent a system of interest approaching a critical point. When universal scaling phenomena is demonstrated and measured in the laboratory, it concerns (from the reductionist perspective, at least) nite systems. Not all points in the abstract space of parameters correspond to these nite systems: for the points at criticality, in particular, the correlation length ξ diverges, in blatant contradiction with the nitude of the actual systems of interest. Thus, for the reductionist these points are best construed as mathematical approximations of properties of sequences of corresponding nite models, having these points as limits (cf. Norton 2012).
Under renormalization the correlation length transforms as
due to rescaling by factor b. Thereby the RG ow is away from criticality upon each successive operation of R b , assuming ξ is nite to begin with (see Figure 1) . Therefore, in order for the renormalisation ow to terminate, a xed point must have a divergent correlation length (critical xed point), or else it must vanish (trivial xed point). Clearly the correlation length must also be divergent for all the points in the basin of attraction of a critical xed point. This basin is the critical manifold. The points in the parameter space that correspond to nite models are not on this manifold -they do not ow to a (critical) xed point under RG transformations. Rather, the basin of attraction of a (critical) xed point comprises points in the space of parameters which are at criticality, featuring control parameters (e.g. temperature, or external magnetic eld) that have been taken to the critical point in the corresponding phase space. Since the correlation length diverges at a (critical) xed-point and everywhere on its associated critical manifold, and since the correlation length cannot diverge without taking a thermodynamic limit, the latter is needed to connect statistical mechanics to the RG xed point.
For concreteness' sake, consider a trajectory in the abstract space of models, induced by smoothly changing one of the control parameters, t. (See gure 1.) This 'physical line' captures how a system modelled by a given Hamiltonian changes as the control parameter moves ever closer to the critical point T c , where the correlation length diverges. This point T c is sometimes called the 'physical critical point', but one shouldn't read too much into this label: a reductionist takes the divergence of the correlation length to indicate, of course, that this point in the space of parameters is at best an idealisation of the nite physical system, or perhaps merely a vehicle for approximating some of the properties represented by the points outside of criticality T < T c . This 'physical line' in the space of models is not an RG ow, and the changing macroscopic properties of a system that tracks such trajectory can be measured in the laboratory, e.g. when critical indices are measured. But these macroscopic changes along a physical line cannot be studied theoretically due to the intractability of the huge number of correlations and interactions at di erent scales due to uctuations near criticality.
The RG framework deals with this intractability by renormalizing the relevant modelling parameters, yielding more and more coarse-grained e ective models in a way that keeps the macroscopic physics unchanged. Any point on the 'physical line' can be taken as the starting point of iterated RG transformations, which induce a corresponding ow in the space of models. Unlike the 'physical line', these ows do not correspond to any physical change of the system, but rather capture equivalence classes of models that share the same long-distance physics. Of all the points on the physical line, the 'physical critical point' is special, since it (and only it) ows to a (critical) xed point upon successive iterations of the renormalization transformation. (That is, this point belongs to the critical manifold.) Figure 1. ) That is, a ow emanating from a point that is su ciently close to a basin of attraction will end up in the vicinity of the critical xed point after some nite number of renormalisation transformations, before veering away from it towards a trivial xed point. In particular, systems modelled by di erent o -critical parameters in the 'critical domain' -the neighbourhood of a critical point where correlation length is very large with respect to the mi-croscopic scale -will end up owing close enough to the critical xed point for the ow to be examined in terms of linearised RG. This examination formally reveals the aspects of the parameter space that are relevant for the value of critical exponents, as well as the aspects that are irrelevant, in the sense that change in the irrelevant parameters is inconsequential to the value of critical exponents.
(See Appendix for details.) Systems with di erent Hamiltonians that only di er in the irrelevant parameters therefore exhibit the same long-distance behaviour near their critical point. They belong to the same universality class.
With the distinction between relevant and irrelevant parameters we can capture an important mathematical fact about the behaviour of a large class of Hamiltonians under a given renormalization transformation. Once we x the laws of statistical physics and an appropriate renormalisation transformation, the fact that two systems A and B are in the same universality class follows with mathematical necessity. For a want of a better analogy, consider, for example, composition of forces. Assume that two di erent sets of force vectors {f 1 , f 2 } and {f 3 , f 4 } result in the same total force f 1 + f 2 = F = f 3 + f 4 . The fact that both sets are similar in this way -they both belong to the same 'universality' class of component vectors that add up to F -follows with mathematical necessity, once we x the law of force composition. Similarly, a given universality class depends on its Hamiltonians in the same way: the fact that two systems with di erent Hamiltonians only vary in the irrevant parameters follows with mathematical necessity, once we x a renormalisation transformation. 13
The Counterfactual Dependence Account of RG Explanations
Having summarised the key concepts of the RG explanans, let us now consider the philosophical issue at stake in the second lacuna: which philosophical account of explanation best captures RG explanations? We think a promising approach to RG explanations is the counterfactual dependence account of scienti c explana- We will now argue in more detail why we think the counterfactual dependence account applies to RG explanations. To do so, we will focus on the core of the account consisting of two necessary conditions for being a scienti c explanation (we follow the exposition in Reutlinger 2016). We ignore other necessary conditions here on which proponents of this account of explanation di er.
First, the counterfactual dependence account requires that one can infer the explanandum from the explanans (where this inference may be deductive or statisticalinductive). In the case of RG explanations, this condition is satis ed because the RG explanans (consisting of Hamiltonians and the theoretical framework of statistical mechanics, RG transformations, the determination of xed point, and so on, as described in §4.1) deductively entails the RG explanandum. We take the satisfaction of this condition to be the kernel of truth in Butter eld's and Norton's claim that RG explanations are DN-explanations (see §2).
Second, the counterfactual dependence account also requires that the explanans allows us to evaluate counterfactuals of the following form as true: "if some variables guring in the explanans had speci c di erent values (which typically corresponds to assuming that the initial conditions of a physical system are di erent than they actually are), then the explanandum phenomenon would also be di erent in some speci c way". RG explanations satisfy this condition, since the RG explanans enables us to determine whether a physical system S would be in a different universality class, if certain features of S were di erent than they actually are. In other words, the RG explanans conveys what being in a speci c universality class counterfactually depends on. For instance, the RG explanans supports the following explanatorily relevant counterfactuals:
• If a physical system S had a di erent spatial dimensionality than it actually has, then S would be in such-and-such a di erent universality class than it actually is in.
• If a physical system S had a di erent symmetry of the order parameter than it actually has, then S would be in such-and-such a di erent universality class than it actually is in.
• If a physical system S had a (su ciently) di erent range of the microscopic interactions than it actually has, then S would be in such-and-such a di erent universality class than it actually is in.
As we have seen in previous sections, it is a central purpose of the RG framework to underwrite such conditionals. First, as discussed in Section 3, the key explanandum regarding universality that was left outstanding in the pre-RG context of mean eld and Landau theories, was the observed dependence of critical exponents and universality classes on those features of the world that seem to carve the nature into these broad kinds. Secondly, as discussed in detail in Section 4.1, the RG framework provides the means to bring out the relevant dependencies, by virtue of showing exactly how critical exponents depend on spatial dimensionality, dimensionality of the spin parameter, and the range of micro-interactions.
Let us highlight the crucial point encoded in the two necessary conditions of the counterfactual dependence account: the RG framework does not only deductively entail that many physical systems with di erent original microphysical Hamiltonians display the same macro-behavior (as required by the rst condition). In addition, the RG framework also provides a wealth of modal information regarding what being in a speci c universality class depends on (thereby satisfying the second necessary condition).
In sum, we take it that the counterfactual dependence account of explanation has a good claim to capture the explanatory character of RG explanations (see Reutlinger 2016 for an in-depth discussion). This addresses the 'second lacuna'.
We are now in a position to use the assumption that the counterfactual dependence account applies to RG explanations to rebut the anti-reductionist challenge.
the xed point Hamiltonian cannot be taken to represent the nite target system, reference to the xed point can be explanatorily indispensable. In particular, xed points are instrumentally indispensable for nding out and expressing facts about those 'models' in the space of parameters that lie in the critical domain but outside of criticality -facts that are explanatorily relevant for critical phenomena. It is these o -critical 'models' that represent the features of the world on which the critical exponents and universality classes depend, and RG analyses explain by virtue of (and to the extent they succeed in) providing correct information about such dependencies (see below). Secondly, reference to critical xed points is indispensable for expressing the explanatorily relevant feature shared by all possible Hamiltonians in a given universality class. This is done by reference to the mathematical fact that upon renormalization they all end up in the vicinity of the same xed point, where their further coarse-graining is similarly dependent only on a few relevant variables (cf. §4.1 (d)). Although it is necessary to make reference to the xed point in expressing and theorising about this feature that the Hamiltonians share, one can again adopt an instrumentalist attitude to the xed point itself, while using it to express the explanatorily relevant feature regarding the physical Hamiltonians' behaviour under coarse-graining.
If we thus grant that reference to xed points is indispensable, how do we avoid an ontological commitment that is in tension with reductionism, and how do we justify the claim that xed points are merely instrumentally indispensable?
Our response relies on the assumption that the counterfactual dependence account captures the explanatory character of the RG explanation. If this is correct, then we naturally relate RG explanation's ontological commitments with those (and only those) variables on which the explanandum depends. Relative to the framework of the counterfactual dependence account, we can draw a distinction between those aspects of an explanation that feature in (or represent) explanatory counterfactual dependence relations, on the one hand, and those aspects that play some other role, e.g. in communicating or facilitating the explanation, on the other. Given such a distinction, an explanation's ontological commitments are naturally associated with the former aspects. That is, only those factors on which the explanandum counterfactually depends carry ontological import.
Much more has been said about this broad philosophical stance towards explanations' realist commitments, e.g. in Saatsi (forthcoming a), which provides a more general analysis of explanatory indispensability with a view to distinguishing between ontologically committing ('thick') and instrumental ('thin') explana- Hence, assumptions about RG xed points can be indispensable without being ontologically committing in a way that poses a threat to reductionism, if the RG explanandum does not counterfactually depend on the xed points. We will now argue that this is the case.
In the light of the counterfactual dependence account of explanation, we see that the RG explanation works by bringing out how the explanandum (viz. critical exponents) counterfactually depends on features such as the spatial dimen- 14 In a similar spirit, Saatsi (forthcoming c) argues for an instrumentalist attitude towards 'strange attractors' and certain other mathematical features that are indispensable in explanations provided by dynamical systems theory. See also Woodward (2003b) . If this reasoning is sound, then the ontological reductionist is able to maintain an instrumentalist attitude towards RG xed points; reference to them in the RG explanations of universality does not have an ontological commitment.
In particular, the kind of explanatory indispensability at stake does not suggest any ontological commitment to facts that are beyond the domain of statistical mechanics.
Admittedly, there is still room here for an explanatory anti-reductionist to protest that we haven't given a full reductionist story, purely in terms of the 'nuts and bolts' of the micro-constituents and their interactions, why in the rst place the mathematical space of parameters has an interesting topological structure shaped by the xed points and critical surfaces. 16 This raises deep issues that require not only a solid grasp of the nature of RG explanations, but also a careful analysis of the nature of explanatory (anti-)reductionism itself. What exactly does it take to underwrite, purely in terms of the 'nuts and bolts' of the reducing theory, an explanatory use of novel theoretical concepts like RG xed points? What exactly is the explanatory anti-reductionist (thus construed) asking from the re-15 Note that we restrict this claim to RG explanations of universality of critical phenomena. Given the extremely broad-ranging applicability of RG methods in statistical physics and quantum eld theory, we consider it an open question whether there are other RG theories which underwrite explanatory counterfactuals with an RG xed-point as a variable, such that they cannot be thought of as capturing an explanatory dependence of the explanandum in question on features of nite physical systems in the vicinity of the xed-point. 16 We appreciate an anonymous referee pressing us on this.
ductionist? These issues require further work, but in our view there is a real risk that explanatory irreducibility turns out to be a thesis that is so undeniable and widespread that it seriously reduces the interest of speci c considerations turning on RG explanations of universality. For instance, consider a popular example from the current literature on explanation: Koenigsberg's bridges' property of being non-Eulerian. This is a novel theoretical concept that is explanatorily indispensable (with respect to the bridges' traversibility), and it is not at all clear how we could hope to give a full reductionist account of the property of being non-Eulerian, purely in terms of the 'nuts and bolts' of the physics that describes the bridges at the microlevel. 17 If one takes this as an argument for some kind of explanatory anti-reductionism, then some kind explanatory anti-reductionism seems undeniable given how quickly examples of this sort multiply, and it is no longer clear what particular contribution is made by the RG explanation of universality.
Conclusion
We have provided a strategy for meeting the anti-reductionist challenge and for rebutting the argument for ontological anti-reductionism from in nite limits in the context of RG explanations of universality. This strategy is broadly in agreement with Norton's metaphor of xed points as a 'mathematical peg', and also with Menon and Callender (2013) . But we think it is critical that an analysis of the explanatory role of xed points is properly couched in the context of a tting philosophical account of the explanation at stake. In as far as the counterfactual dependence account of explanation provides a tting account, a reductionist can happily admit the explanatory indispensability of the limits involved in RG xed points.
The challenge of explanatory anti-reductionism, raised by Batterman in particular, requires more discussion than we are able to provide here. In our view the issue at stake is clouded by the current lack of clarity as to the exact nature of explanatory anti-reductionism -this is why we have chosen to focus on an explicitly ontological construal of the anti-reductionist challenge. For example, Menon and Callender (2013, 210) characterise explanatory irreducibility, reasonably, as taking 17 A connected graph G is Eulerian i every vertex has an even degree. In connection with this now well worn example the philosophical discussion has taken an explicitly ontological turn (e.g. Pincock 2007) . Indeed, explanatory anti-reductionism is more or less taken as for granted, the only issue of real interest being ontological.
place "when the explanation of a higher-level phenomenon requires a conceptual novelty, yet the reducing theory does not have the resources to explain why the conceptual novelty is warranted. " In the context of the RG explanation of universality the question then is whether or not the more fundamental theory has the resources to explain why the explanatory appeal to xed points and critical surfaces of RG space is warranted. As discussed at the end of the previous section, it is not clear to us what this question amounts to exactly -what is being asked by way of providing reductionist warrant for novel theoretical concepts. But we do maintain that this question cannot be answered without taking properly into account the nature of the RG explanation, and the preceding analysis contributes to this task. To recall, we claim to have shown how the reductionist can understand how RG xed points and critical surfaces are instrumental in approximating aspects of nite physical systems near criticality, and how they function as indispensable instruments in bringing out explanatory dependencies between physical variables. But their explanatory indispensability notwithstanding, the reductionist can consistently maintain that the xed points and critical surfaces do not represent anything at all in the nite systems that exhibit universality.
Appendix: Linearised RG
In this appendix we elaborate on the structure of RG ows in the vicinity of the xed point where RG transformations can be linearised in a way that supports the distinction between relevant and irrelevant parameters. (Linearised RG analysis also supports quantitative calculation of critical exponents.) Our exposition follows Nishimori and Ortiz (2010) .
We are interested in a renormalization transformation from u to u = R b (u) in the vicinity of the xed point. Writing these two points in terms of small deviations from the xed point we have u = u * + δu, and u = u * + δu . In the neighbourhood of the xed point R b (u) can be expanded to rst order: where the exponent y i characterises the parameter ow near the xed point. Remarkably, critical phenomena can be determined from these exponents and the scaling variables. Linearisation of the RG ow near the xed point thus reduces the study of scaling phenomena near criticality to the determination of these quantities.
In the vicinity of the xed point u * , where the linearised RG theory is valid, the nature of the parameter space is characterised by the scaling variables g i , as well as the exponents y i (associated with the eigenvalues λ i ). In relation to the local axes given by φ i , the scaling variables identify certain directions of the parameter space as relevant for its critical behaviour: namely, the directions of the eigenvectors φ i for which y i > 0. The scaling variables in these directions are the relevant variables. The scaling variables with negative exponents (y i > 0) are irrelevant, and the variables with y i = 0 are marginal. This distinction implies a classi cation of di erent types of xed points. In particular, critical xed points must have both relevant and irrelevant scaling variables in order to be associated with phase-transitions and critical points: the critical manifold (discussed earlier)
is spanned by the eigenvectors associated with the irrelevant scaling variables, forming the basin of attraction of the xed point. 18 The relevant scaling variables can in turn be identi ed with the control parameters, the tuning of which is relevant to critical phenomena (e.g. t and h in magnetic systems).
This distinction between relevant and irrelevant scaling variables delineates the explanatorily critical features of non-renormalised, physical Hamiltoniansthe features on which the critical exponents depend. The critical exponents depend only on the relevant variables, in the following sense. In the vicinity of the xed point the relevance of these variables amounts to the fact that the RG ow veers away from the xed point, in directions that are "orthogonal" to the critical manifold. A universality class depends on the way in which RG ows from di erent starting points (di erent physical Hamiltonians) are similar in this way. (See e.g. Pathria and Beale, 2009. p. 436 .) The irrelevance of the irrelevant variables, on the other hand, amounts to the fact that in the vicinity of the xed point changes in the irrelevant variables do not determine a system's scaling properties under coarse-graining; only changes in the relevant variables matter.
The only explanatory relevance that we can associate with the irrelevant variables turns on the fact that systems that di er only in the irrelevant variables, within a given universality class, are similar the sense that their coarse-grained descriptions asymptotically coincide: if the relevant scaling variables vanishviz. if the relevant control parameters are tuned to criticality -then any change in the remaining, irrelevant parameters is immaterial to the large-distance properties, since iterated renormalisation of any Hamiltonian on the critical manifold ows to the same critical xed point.
